



# Joint Center for Lessons Learned



## *BULLETIN* *Volume II, Issue II*



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## From the Staff

The important lessons learned for all personnel to know are in the field with you, not with us. The JCLL has the mission and the means to share those lessons with the rest of the joint community. If you or your unit have a "lesson" that could help others do it right the first time, then send it to us. Don't wait until you have a polished article. The JCLL can take care of the editing, format, and layout. We want the raw material that can be packaged and then shared with everyone. Please take the time to put your good ideas on paper and get them to the JCLL. We will acknowledge receipt and then work with you to put your material in a publishable form with **you as the author**.

**We want your e-mail address**, please send your command e-mail address to us at [jcll@jwfc.jfcom.mil](mailto:jcll@jwfc.jfcom.mil). Our future plans call for electronic dissemination of various material.

### REMEMBER!!!

TIMELY SUBMISSION OF INTERIM REPORTS, AFTER-ACTION REPORTS, AND LESSONS LEARNED RESULTS IN MORE TIMELY, QUALITY PRODUCTS AND ANALYSIS FROM THE JCLL STAFF.

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
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**Message from the Commander**  
**MG William S. Wallace, USA**  
Commander, JFCOM JWFC

First, let me thank all those who submitted articles for this issue. Taking the time to write about your Kosovo experiences, and the lessons you may have learned, is greatly appreciated. For those of you interested in writing a piece for future issues, I'd like to encourage you to do so. It is through your collective efforts that the JCLL Bulletin will continue to provide interesting articles of use to the joint community.

Kosovo, and the associated operations of ALLIED FORCE / NOBLE ANVIL, SHINING HOPE, and JOINT GUARDIAN, continue to hold our attention. In this issue of the JCLL Bulletin we learn about some of the less momentous, though no less important, aspects of the first two operations. Three articles written by USEUCOM HQs officers provide the reader with a look into the operations of the Headquarters' Strategic Planning Group (SPG), the challenging construction timeline of Camp HOPE, and the conduct of the Intelligence Working Group during the EUCOM Kosovo "Quick Look" Symposium. Two Service lessons learned centers, the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) and the Air Force Center for Knowledge Sharing (AFCKS), also provided articles. Through CALL we find out about the role played



by the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) and Army Simulations in preparing Task Force Hawk to plan deep operations. From AFCKS we learn of deployment problems identified during ALLIED FORCE. The last article, written by one of the JCLL military analysts supporting JTF NOBLE ANVIL, talks to the deficiencies of the current joint lessons learned system and what might be done to change the system.

The articles in this bulletin are intended to be thought provoking, professionally useful, and interesting to you as you plan and execute joint operations and training events. We continue to solicit your criticism, advice, and comments in our work to produce a bulletin that enhances the training and readiness of the joint community.

WILLIAM S. WALLACE  
Major General, US Army  
Commander, JFCOM JWFC

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## JCLL Update



***Mr. Mike Runnals***  
***JCLL Deputy Director***

Joint Center for Lessons Learned activities of the past quarter have focused on the development and implementation of two initiatives, the publication of a third quarterly bulletin, and the movement of offices from Fort Monroe to the Joint Warfighting Center training facility in Suffolk, Virginia.

The formal delineation of Joint Staff (JS) and US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) lessons learned system responsibilities was effected with the February signing of a Memorandum of Agreement between the JS Directorate of Operational Plans and Interoperability J7 and the USJFCOM Joint Warfighting Center. Essentially, the Director JS J7 will provide lessons learned program policy and management guidance while the Commander JWFC will direct the management of JCLL functions, tasks, and resources. The JCLL will operate as a supporting organization to the CJCS, JWFC, Combatant Commands, Combat support agencies, and the Services. Members of the JS J7 and the JWFC JCLL have already formed the JCLL Working Group and have begun work on revising the Joint After-Action Reporting System (JAARS) instruction.

The second initiative to bear fruit during these three months is the development of a web browser observation input tool. Because of the difficulties in designing such a form for every possible web server configuration, the JWFC Systems Engineering Division devised a method to input a lesson learned observation form over the NIPRNET/SIPRNET to a JWFC web server. NetJIIP, the Network Joint Instructional Input Program, includes subroutines to import data from web-based input into an Oracle database, then export it into a WinJIIP file format. The

JCLL is currently alpha testing NetJIIP. NetJIIP will be available to the joint community for beta testing after completion of internal testing.

The printing of this issue establishes the *JCLL Bulletin* as a joint quarterly publication. It also marks the bulletin's first inclusion of lessons learned-related articles from recent real-world military operations. The JCLL worked with Headquarters USEUCOM, the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), and the Air Force Center for Knowledge Sharing (AFCKS) to put together the articles on Kosovo operations that appear in this issue. Based upon its own related experiences, the JCLL included an article that addresses some of the deficiencies of the current joint lessons learned system.

During the week of 14-18 February the JCLL moved equipment, furniture, and personnel from its offices at Fort Monroe, where it was established in December 1996, to new accommodations at the JWFC Joint Training, Analysis & Simulation Center (JTASC) in Suffolk, Virginia. While postal mail and e-mail addresses of the JCLL and its members have not changed, the address to the JCLL SIPRNET web site has. To reach the new JCLL SIPRNET web site we recommend you delete your current bookmark to the JCLL, type the new Universal Resource Locator (URL) >jcll.jwfc.jfcom.smil.mil< into your web browser Locator/Address line, then bookmark the new JCLL site. Please contact any member of the JCLL if you have difficulty accessing the web site.

As always, we encourage those of you who have suggestions or recommendations concerning JCLL operations to contact our staff. Our new phone numbers are located on the inside of the front cover.

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## Index of Articles

This is the sixth edition of the Joint Center for Lessons Learned Bulletin. As our audience gets larger with each issue we thought it would be appropriate to bring everyone up-to-date with the topics from the five previous issues of the bulletin. All the back issues are available on line at <http://www.jwfc.jfcom.mil> or on the SIPRNET at <http://www.jccl.jwfc.jfcom.smil.mil>. All issues are still available in hardcopy except for "February 97".

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# **Creating A Theater-Level Crystal Ball: Using the Fundamentals of Mission Analysis in a Rapidly Changing World**

*USEUCOM J-5 Plans*

In today's rapidly changing world, a planning cell can not always wait for guidance. In many cases, the rough outlines of potential military missions - along with potential problems and pitfalls - can be discerned far in advance of policy guidance. With this information in hand, planning staffs can help shape decisions with well-developed analysis delivered to senior decision makers before the first JCS Warning Order. In March, 1999, USEUCOM J-5 established the Strategic Planning Group (SPG) with the unique charter of 'predicting the future' out to a horizon of 2 years. The SPG was comprised of representatives from each of the J-Codes and special staffs, and met once every two weeks. After an initial period of trial and error, the SPG developed a methodology that succeeded in at least initially framing issues for decision makers. The purpose of this article is to describe the methodology used by the SPG, and provide an example of an SPG product.

The methodology passed through several distinct steps in order:

## **Step 1: Identify the Next Crisis**

- Scan publications such as "The Early Bird" for emerging trends and issues impacting on the theater – particularly those with policy statements. Extract as much information as possible as if each sentence was part of a Warning Order.
- Examine on-going operations, and ask "What's Next?" In the case of a mid-intensity conflict for example, expect the possibility of a follow-on peace accord, an interim administration, and a humanitarian component. In the case of warring factions, you might anticipate a series of observer missions, a peace keeping operation, or a humanitarian operation. Historically examine operations such as Panama, Haiti, Grenada, Yugoslavia, and Desert Storm, for the "nominal" pattern of follow-on activity.
- Use indicators designed to illuminate serious trends in a nation's well-being. In particular, predictive models and published economic analyses can point out areas in the theater that will become hot-spots in the next few years. Contingency operations are often preceded by disturbances in the economic, social, or resource structures within a country.
- If time is available, matrix these trends against the theater strategy to begin to generate an appreciation for those that may require military involvement. Use this matrix to determine the top 2 or 3 that the SPG will consider.

## **Step 2: Determine the Components of the Crisis.**

Each crisis is unique. In the case of NATO operations against Yugoslavia, we anticipated that – regardless of the military outcome – a humanitarian operation would follow. The challenge was to identify the component pieces. We examined historical humanitarian operations and found that events normally flow in a particular order: Safety and security, physical human needs, infrastructure and house rebuilding, and institutions. The SPG took each of these issues apart from top to bottom.



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### **Step 3: Generate and Apply Metrics.**

Once the components of a potential crisis are determined, the planning group searches for metrics to apply against these parts in order to generate rough, order-of-magnitude studies. There are several different sources for metrics, and all must be exploited in order to properly frame the issues:

- Open Source / Internet. Look for similar cases – in the case of Kosovo, we used Bosnia data as a starting point for metrics. If you want to determine the cost of rebuilding a damaged house, plug Bosnia into your search engine. Very quickly, you can find how much money has been dedicated annually to house rebuilding AND how many houses have been rebuilt in a year. This generates a planning metric that can be used in the analysis. You can also find out how many houses are rebuilt, details on infrastructure repair, tons of material per house, and so on. Details on demographics, electrical power, and weather can all be found here.
- Military Analysis. Military products are extremely useful in identifying the capacities of the regional infrastructure, for example. Immediately complete an infrastructure analysis that looks at rail, road, and air throughput into the troubled region in terms of short tons per day.
- Interagency Sources. Interagency players, such as the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) can provide an amazing variety of metrics that indicate food, water, shelter, hygiene, and other requirements on a per capita basis. Most of these agencies also have unclassified web sites.

Where possible, the SPG located and applied one or more metrics to each of the components of the crisis.

### **Step 4. Identify and Arrange Possible Work Required.**

As you complete Step 3, you will begin to identify the requirements and shortfalls that will impact on the crisis. In each shortfall area, you can describe a requirement for work that must be done in order to stabilize the crisis. Additionally, you can begin to arrange work in the order in which it must logically proceed. For example, mines must be cleared before infrastructure is repaired. Infrastructure must be repaired before rebuilding material can be moved in bulk. Money, planning, and organization must precede all other activities. In this step, you can also begin to nail down the potential military missions that the theater may be required to perform.

### **Step 5. Synthesize and Publish.**

Each metric, by itself, means little. It is only when metrics are taken as a group that we begin to see that there will be insufficient shelter for the winter; or that mine clearing will take decades; or that water must be trucked in. Use the planning group as a whole to analyze the metrics that you've identified. Finally, forward the report to a senior decision maker so that the chain of command is aware of the issues BEFORE the warning order is received.

### **Step 6. Move On.**

Once one issue is complete and in the hands of a senior decision maker, go back to step one and identify and analyze the next possible crisis. Additionally, an existing analysis is improved by a new metric – know what metrics you're missing. The more potential crises you are able to cover with this method, the better the theater will be served.

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Some Observations on the Method. What we found is striking. First, it is almost a guarantee that you will be the only entity with the detailed analysis on hand when the crisis hits and the phone calls start. This is an incredible position to be in at the hour of crisis. It allows you to very clearly explain the scope and scale of the crisis, as well as make reasoned recommendations as to a way ahead.

EUCOM found that this method provided not only a fairly detailed “warning order” for the senior leadership on potential issues which could flow from current operations, but also resulted in a core of individuals across the staff who were well-versed with information that allowed them to assist in future planning. However, it should be noted that not all of the efforts of the EUCOM SPG resulted in useable products. Sometimes this was because the crisis we were attempting to anticipate never occurred, or because events took a turn that negated the planning. Still, the SPG and its results were well worth the efforts involved, and this is a technique that will continue to be used within EUCOM.



Photo Courtesy DoD Joint Combat Camera

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## Construction of Camp Hope as Part of JTF Shining Hope

LCDR Pete Lynch, CEC, USN  
EUCOM J-5

*Editors note : This article has been edited due to its length, a complete version of this article can be found on the JCLL web site at "<http://jwfc.jfcom.mil>" or "<http://jcll.jwfc.jfcom.smil.mil>."*

On April 22, 1999, the National Command Authority (NCA), through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), committed the United States to construct a 20,000-person refugee camp in Albania. The NCA assigned construction responsibility to the United States European Command (USEUCOM), who in-turn assigned the task to Joint Task Force-Shining Hope (JTF-SH), already operating in Albania. At the time, JTF-SH had neither previous construction responsibility nor assigned staffing to build a 20,000-person refugee camp. The first increment of camp shelter (for 2,500 refugees) was to be completed 10 days from date of receipt of the order, with the remaining camp increments (for an additional 17,500 refugees) to be completed within 30 days. Additionally, the CJCS order required USEUCOM to maximize efforts to construct and support the camp by contract. Upon completion, the camp was to be turned-over to, and operated by, NGOs.

While an essential element for success was quickly assembling the key players, the first step was identifying the key players and their respective roles and responsibilities. Although that statement seems straight forward, it was one of the most difficult aspects of the whole construction evolution.

**KEY PLAYERS, ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES.** The following agencies and organizations were instrumental in planning, coordinating, and building Camp Hope:

•**U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Disaster Assessment Response Team (DART).** The DART deployed to Albania early in the crisis, and worked closely with the U.S. Embassy, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), NGOs, and Government of Albania (GoA) officials. The DART provided a very helpful liaison cell linking the Department of State to JTF-SH (Forward) in Albania. Recent DART experience with other operations provided excellent insight for all concerned.

•**U.S. Military Civil Affairs (CA).** The CA teams included personnel from both the active duty and reserve components. An active duty detail came from the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, while individual reserve personnel were tasked from both the 353th Civil Affairs Command and the 308th Civil Affairs Brigade. The CA teams worked as the bridge between all non-military entities and the JTF Commander and staff. The CA teams were the best-suited military element to differentiate between the *requirements* and *desires* of the UNHCR, NGOs and refugees. The CJCS order stated camp construction standards would be developed in coordination with the government of Albania, USAID, and UNHCR. The diligent efforts of the CA and DART teams were essential in building consensus among these players and ensured that Camp Hope was constructed to an appropriate standard. They also ensured the NGOs were supported in their mission to operate and maintain the camp.

•**United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).** UNHCR had a large staff in Albania throughout the refugee crisis, although the staff was largely administrative and many personnel lacked field experience. The CJCS Order stated that UNHCR would provide camp standards and guidance on camp administration. However, the DART and CA teams were key to ensuring that Camp Hope was

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constructed to appropriate standards.

•**NGO Coalition.** NGO leadership is provided by a wide array of people with varying technical, experiential, and cultural backgrounds. Camp Hope was operated by a coalition of five different NGOs, each having a specific role in camp operations. Coordinating their individual needs and requirements was a major challenge. Although C.A.R.E. was identified as the lead, the NGOs operated as a loosely knitted alliance without a clearly defined leader. Listed below are the individual NGOs involved with Camp Hope:

-The NGO responsible for overall management and operation of the camp was the Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (C.A.R.E).

-Medical Emergency Relief International (MERLIN) operated the medical facilities.

-Educational facilities were operated by Save the Children.

-Action Contre la Faim-United States chapter (ACF/US) was responsible for water purity and safety, distribution, and storage. They were also responsible for overall camp sanitation. The term water covers a very broad responsibility including identifying sources, distribution, storage, and keeping the entire system sanitary and safe. Sanitation had a similarly broad definition, including solid and sanitary waste management and transportation, as well as overall camp sanitary practices.

-Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA) was responsible for food storage and distribution.

•**U.S. Embassy Country Team.** The country team in Albania was small in relation to the overwhelming challenge with which they were faced. The whole team maximized their resources and coordinated all actions with the Government of Albania.

•**Military Staff Engineers.** Although no troop units were used for construction, staff engineers, working with contractor personnel, were critical at all steps including initial planning, site selection, final planning, construction (technical and quality assurance), and turnover of the camp.

•**Construction Agency.** For Camp Hope, the U.S. Air Force Contract Augmentation Program (AFCAP) contractor was responsible for building the refugee camp. JTF-SH, led by Commander, 3rd Air Force, and supported by the Headquarters, United States Air Forces Europe (USAFE), opted to use the AFCAP contract, an on-the-shelf, cost-plus incentive award fee contract, designed to provide quick response on the front end of contingencies. The contractor's involvement was essential during all phases of the camp construction. The contractor's flexibility and responsiveness to competing NGO demands was a noteworthy, positive aspect of building Camp Hope. The Defense Logistics Agency, Southern Europe District provided the contract administration, while USAFE Civil Engineering provided a Quality Assurance team.

•**Legal Affairs.** Legal staffs were involved at all levels of the operation. Building a refugee camp in a foreign country with a U.S. contractor and turning over the completed camp and all associated equipment to an NGO presented several legal challenges. Continuous involvement of legal staffs precluded several potential showstoppers, including verification of authority and final documentation required to support the property transfer. The key to NGO turnover upon completion was to document that the cost to disassemble, repair, repack, and transport all equipment, as well the cost to restore the camp site to original condition, clearly exceeded the residual value of the camp assets (\$12.6m, as compared to a residual value of recoverable assets after depreciation of only \$4.7m.)

•**Security/Force Protection.** Albania is a hostile environment with several prominent, organized crime elements and various rogue criminals. In addition, there was always a threat that small teams could make shows of force to discredit the U.S. A Company of U.S. Marines was deployed to the site to provide force protection for the contractor, the U.S. quality control personnel, and contract administration staffs. Local law enforcement officials were also used to complement the Marines and provided a valuable link with the local population. Internal camp security for the refugees was an NGO responsi-

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bility, with the occasional assistance of the Marines and local officials. The camp briefly received direct small arms fire on one occasion, and several threats during the construction. Consultation with the security and force protection staffs early, ensured that correct proactive steps were taken to properly secure the site.

### **SITE SELECTION.**

Choosing a site to build a 20,000-person refugee camp was the next step. The site must be accessible to land transportation, must drain very well, and have soil suitable for construction. The most difficult element was an available water source to supply one million liters of water per day (50 liters/person/day for 20,000 people). Further complicating site-selection were ambiguous ownership claims by federal and local governments, as well as private individuals. Despite diligent efforts by all concerned, the U.S. Government never attained a formal Government of Albania (GoA) agreement to use the land for Camp Hope. The JTF Commander had nothing more than a handshake agreement from GoA officials when the contractor mobilized and started work on the site.

### **PLANNING FACTORS.**

Developing planning factors and the correct ratios for a complete camp was an iterative process that required continuous communications between all parties to tailor the planning factors to the refugee population. Many Kosovar refugees drove their personal vehicles to the refugee camps, owned cellular phones, and were accustomed to both running water at their homes, and a diverse diet prepared on typical western appliances. Balancing the minimum basic life support requirements against expectations based on a higher standard of living was a difficult reality for the refugees to accept.

***PLANNING FROM THE REAR.*** Before the site was selected, generic camp layouts and planning factor guidance were found in various documents. After-action reports and Joint Universal Lessons Learned System (JULLS) entries on refugee camps built in Rwanda, Turkey/Iraq, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRoC), and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba were helpful. The best source of information was the USAID's Field Operations Guide (USAID-FOG). Also useful were the Sphere Manual, UNHCR published standards and personal interaction with members of the 96 Civil Affairs Battalion, as well as discussions with members from the USAID DART. Despite the extensive initial planning efforts, neither a viable camp layout nor planning factors could be finalized without the actual site identified and interaction with the ultimate camp operators (NGOs).

***PLANNING ON THE GROUND.*** After planning from the rear was completed, the proposed camp layout and planning factors were presented to the managing NGOs, UNHCR, construction contractor, and the DART. The discussions took place over several weeks and resulted in finalizing minimum requirements for a 20,000-person camp.

***FINAL PLANNING.*** The final criteria and specific details are provided on the JCLL web sites (<http://jwfc.jfcom.mil> or <http://jcll.jwfc.jfcom.smil.mil>) but are omitted here due to print length restrictions.

### **CONSTRUCTION TIMELINE.**

The first construction increment to accommodate 2,500 refugees was completed in 13 days. The entire refugee camp was completed in 51 days.

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## **METHOD OF CONSTRUCTION.**

The contractor utilized Albanian workers and equipment for most of the construction activities and provided contractor leadership using expatriates. The mix of talent was effective and resulted in a relatively low cost option for the camp construction, and reserved military engineers for future operations. The construction details are provided on the JCLL web sites (<http://jwfc.jfcom.mil> or <http://jcll.jwfc.jfcom.smil.mil>).

## **GOVERNMENT FURNISHED MATERIALS (GFM).**

The largest contribution of GFM was GP Medium tents (approx. 2,000 tents). The first batch of GP Medium tents supplied to Camp Hope was a commercial specification type and they leaked severely in moderate rainstorms. The Humanitarian Assistance Program (HAP) obtained the original shipment of tents free of charge from the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Office (DRMO). HAP turned the tents over to Defense Security and Cooperation Agency for use in humanitarian relief efforts. The GP Medium tents leaked and were turned into DRMO due to a horizontal seam design flaw. In the end, military specification tents, procured for a second refugee camp which was never built, were diverted to Camp Hope to replace the commercial specification GP Medium tents initially supplied.

## **SUMMARY OF COSTS.**

- Total cost for the contractor's efforts was 24 million dollars
- Total cost for GFM was approximately 4.2 million dollars
- Total cost to transport GFM was approximately 1 million dollars
- Grand total cost of Camp Hope was just under 30 million dollars

## **CAMP TURNOVER AND DISPOSITION.**

The camp was turned over in phases so the NGO community always supported the operations of the refugee camp. As each village was completed, the NGO took responsibility for the modules. The mechanism was a simple Memorandum of Understanding between the U.S. Ambassador to Albania and the UNHCR. The supporting documentation included a cost analysis to show that it was more expensive to disassemble and ship the components than the components themselves were worth, so it was cost effective to excess the whole camp. A complete legal review of the cost analysis and justification paperwork was completed to ensure that the transfer of U.S. property to UNHCR was consistent with U.S. law.

In Summary:

- There is no single, best solution for refugee camps in all countries.
- Constant communication between the Department of State (DoS) representatives, Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) community, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), contractors, and military forces is essential.
- Adequate supply of water must be available on site to meet the total camp requirement.
- Maximum participation, early in the process, by as many of the actors as possible, will significantly enhance the chances for complete mission success.

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## **Operation Allied Force: Intelligence Lessons Learned**

*HQUSEUCOM J-2*

The cessation of the air campaign in Kosovo and subsequent deployment of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) into the troubled province signaled the end of Operation ALLIED FORCE, “NATO’s first war.” Intelligence was a major player throughout the campaign and made a very significant contribution to the successful conclusion of the operation. The operation consumed a major share of the nation’s intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets. Shortfalls in the number and capabilities of ISR platforms, crews, communications and tasking, processing exploitation and dissemination (TPED) personnel limited theater intelligence capabilities. The Joint Analysis Center (JAC) became NATO’s designated intelligence center and intelligence provided for the Alliance by the JAC was instrumental in maintaining NATO solidarity through the campaign.

Joint Task Force (JTF) NOBLE ANVIL was established in Naples, Italy to command and control U.S. forces committed to NATO’s Operation ALLIED FORCE. These forces included the USS Theodore Roosevelt Battle Group, the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), the 31st Air Expeditionary Wing at Aviano, additional Air Force expeditionary wings and squadrons deployed to the United Kingdom, Italy, and Hungary. Additional forces included the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) in Brindisi, Italy; Task Force HAWK in Tirana, Albania; Task Force SABRE in Skopje, Former Republic of Macedonia (FYROM); and a Marine Corps F-18 squadron in Hungary. Organic intelligence systems and personnel supported each of these organizations.

Key NATO command and control nodes included the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Allied Forces South (AFSOUTH) in Naples, and the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) in Vicenza, Italy. As the lead element of KFOR, the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) Headquarters also deployed to Skopje, FYROM for the duration of the operation.

Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets committed to the operation included national, theater, and tactical sensors including unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The JAC at RAF Molesworth was the hub of intelligence support for the operation. Other key theater intelligence nodes included the USEUCOM J2 staff, the J2 staff of JTF NOBLE ANVIL in Naples, the combined intelligence staff (C2) and the National Collection Management Cell (NCMC) at the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) in Vicenza, Italy, the US National Intelligence Cell (USNIC) in Sarajevo, Bosnia, Task Force Hawk G2 in Tirana, Albania, and the USAFE intelligence staff and the 32 Air Intelligence Squadron (AIS) at Ramstein Air Base in Germany.

Ten days after the end of combat operations in Kosovo, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) tasked the Command to capture the issues and lessons learned arising out of Operation ALLIED FORCE. The CJCS-directed Kosovo “Quick Look” assessment was designed to identify the most critical lessons learned in three major functional areas: deployment/employment, alliance and coalition warfare, and intelligence support for operations. USEUCOM subsequently tasked its component commands and joint task forces to identify those areas that went well and not so well. A EUCOM Kosovo Quick Look Symposium was held at Headquarters in mid-July. Working groups were estab-



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lished to capture the key lessons learned in each of the functional areas and to finalize the Command's input to CJCS. The group that worked Intelligence Support for Operations was chaired by the USEUCOM Intelligence Plans Division and included representatives from the USEUCOM staff, JTF NOBLE ANVIL, the JAC, US Army Europe (USAREUR), US Navy Europe (USNAVEUR), US Air Forces in Europe (USAFE), and US Marine Forces Europe (USMARFOREUR).

The 12 topics listed below are the key issues identified by the Intelligence Support to Operations Working Group during the EUCOM Kosovo Quick Look Symposium. The first eight topics were included in the Command's consolidated response to the CJCS and referenced in a personal message from the CINCEUR to the Chairman, JCS

- ISR Force Structure Shortfalls
- Size of the Intelligence Workforce
- Relationships with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
- Multilevel Security Requirements
- The Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS)
- Information Management Problems
- Geospatial Imagery and Services (GIS) Support
- Use of Collaborative Tools
- The Linked Operations-Intelligence Centers Europe (LOCE) System
- Procedures and Responsibilities for Targeting Support
- Casualty Estimates
- Operations Security/Communications Security (OPSEC/COMSEC) Requirements

Although the details on all of the above topics cannot be included in this article, we have included one to illustrate the scope, format, and level of detail that were included in the Quick Look report.

### **Information Management Problems**

**OBSERVATION:** There are two related shortfalls in this area: information overload and difficulties in finding what was needed.

**DISCUSSION:** Electronic intelligence dissemination has resulted in an explosion of information. A flood of analyses, reports, imagery products and e-mails threatened to overload all-source analysts throughout the theater. At the JAC, all-source analysts researched and analyzed as many as 85-100 items of intelligence/day. "Information fatigue" became a reality in some analytical areas. The explosion of information had a second effect in that so much data and information were available that supporting file servers and communications systems were severely overloaded, slowing access and downloads to websites, imagery products, and analytical reports. "Rubber-necking" at imagery file servers by casual visitors contributed to overload and access problems. At deployed units and tactical-level organizations, untrained personnel had trouble working with a variety of different automated systems to find and access time-sensitive imagery and other critical intelligence information.

**LESSON LEARNED:** Information overload can severely handicap intelligence research, analysis, and reporting, particularly when supporting data processing systems and communications are limited in their carrying capacities.

**RECOMMENDATION:** These shortfalls underscore the need for a comprehensive intelligence information management program to establish formal mechanisms for prioritizing use of communications lines, promoting greater access to and visibility of needed information, and to lessen the complexity of searching for and retrieving data. JCS must lead a directed effort to ensure end-users at all levels have appropriate receive terminal equipment. USEUCOM should establish a theater Information Management office to conduct training and develop policies and procedures designed to reduce overload and ensure required products can be easily accessed.

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On 28 June 1999, the USEUCOM Director of Intelligence requested the component commands and joint task force organizations to provide a comprehensive list of their intelligence lessons learned as inputs to a theater-wide compendium of Kosovo intelligence lessons learned. The reason for creating this document were threefold:

- to help identify and shape near-term issues and actions to improve the Theater's overall intelligence capabilities;
- to answer Command and National-level requests for inputs and briefings on intelligence lessons learned; and
- to produce an easy-to-reference document that can help in future operations

Over 400 separate lessons learned were received in response to this tasker. These were subsequently incorporated into a document entitled the *USEUCOM Compendium of Kosovo Intelligence Lessons*



*Learned* or *C-KILL* as this document is more commonly known.

The document is organized into eight sections. Within each section, a brief profile of the key intelligence organization(s), roles, and functions is included. A comprehensive listing, by subject/title, of all reported intelligence lessons learned provides the reader with a quick overview of what is included within the section. A detailed description of each lesson learned follows. The vast majority of these are described in Joint Universal Lessons Learned System (JULLS) format. In almost all cases, the originator's exact wording has been retained.

In addition to the intelligence lessons learned, the document includes a significant events timeline for Operation ALLIED FORCE, and an overview of the Balkans intelligence surveillance and recon-

naissance architecture that was developed to support the operation.

The USEUCOM C-KILL document is available on-line via the Intelink-S system and can be viewed through the USEUCOM Home Page at:

<http://www.eucom.smil.mil/ecj2/j2p/ciap/INTEL-DOCS/intdocs.htm>

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## **Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) and Army Simulations**

*LTC Jeff Cobb and Mr. Bob Fielding  
BCTP*

The overarching theme of this article is the effectiveness of the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) and the use of simulations in support of contingency operations. The team found that, overall, BCTP is assisting units in developing processes and building teams to plan and conduct operations. BCTP observed the V Corps Deep Operations Coordination Center (DOCC), which was the core of the TF Hawk DOCC, in a Warfighter exercise immediately prior to the deployment. The leadership of the task force all agreed that the involvement of BCTP enhanced the ability of the DOCC to effectively plan deep operations. The team also discovered that BCTP and exercise units need to re-look the startex agreements for exercises to ensure that the conditions experienced by the units are realistic. Finally, the Army needs to take a close look at the current family of simulations. The current models do not fully support the requirements of BCTP and units to conduct rigorous, realistic exercises.

### **The Battle Command Training Program**

BCTP is the Army's capstone Combat Training Center (CTC). The mission of BCTP is to support realistic, stressful training for Army Forces (ARFOR), Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC), Corps, Divisions, and Brigade Commanders and their staffs, to assist the Chief of Staff Army (CSA) in fulfilling his obligation to provide trained and ready units to win decisively on the modern battlefield and to conduct contingency operations worldwide. BCTP provides command and battle staff training for brigade, division, and corps commanders, their staffs, major subordinate commanders (MSC), and supporting special operations forces (SOF), using simulation centers world wide. It provides the framework to conduct command and control training from brigade to Joint Task Force (JTF) level operations. BCTP provides a "free thinking" opposing force (OPFOR), certified observer controllers/trainers, and senior observers as mentors and coaches.

### **Corps Battle Simulation**

BCTP currently uses the Corps Battle Simulation (CBS) as its exercise driver. CBS is a Command Post Exercise (CPX) driver, used primarily to train Corps and Division command and staff personnel operating in their tactically deployed command posts. CBS is a training model, not an analytical model. It is an attrition-based model at the aggregate level. The model forces conflict to drive command post operations and planning.

CBS employs a central VAX computer and many netted MicroVAX computers to generate the simulation. This computer network, coupled with the simulation software and the workstation controllers, "fight" the battle in real time, that is, one hour of game time is equal to one hour of clock time. CBS has the capability to play both belligerent forces that engage in combat when an enemy is detected and within weapons range, and non-belligerent forces that do not engage in direct fire combat even though an enemy is detected and within weapons range. The workstation controllers interact with the simulation via the workstation equipment and portray subordinate unit functions.

The unit used CBS, Tactical Simulation (TACSIM), and Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation (JCATS) for simulation support during the mission rehearsal exercise (MRE). The Army does not have any

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single simulation model that can be used for deployment training and operations. CBS and TACSIM were used to portray the intelligence and JCATS provided the detail required for mission execution.

### **The Effectiveness of BCTP**

In discussions with senior leaders in the Task Force, the general consensus was that the recent unit Warfighter Exercise (WFX), and the events leading up to the exercise, were effective in preparing the Task Force to plan deep operations. The Task Force Deputy Commander, the Attack Helicopter Regimental Commander, and the Force Artillery Commander all believed that the WFX assisted the units and the DOCC in building and refining the DOCC processes, and forming and solidifying the DOCC team. The aviation commander stated the mechanics remain the same for both the high-intensity combat exercised during the BCTP process and the current contingency operations. Several of the commanders stated the senior observers and their involvement in the recent WFX were of great assistance to the DOCC team. These senior retired officers provided realistic insight into deep operations and the role of deep operations in prosecuting the fight.

The leaders raised several issues with the BCTP format. First was the need to get to a higher level of fidelity in the execution of operations. The leadership would like to get down to the entity level in execution to provide more realistic feedback to the tactical operations centers. Second was that the WFXs do not provide the same stress and rigor of actual operations since there are no soldiers on the ground in harm's way. One commander stressed the need for units to consider the people aspect of decisions during WFXs and not treat the soldiers as icons. Third was that WFXs do not train units to operate over the distances simulated during the exercises (mainly a communications issue).

The leaders identified several differences between the WFX and the current operation. The first was the greater level of detail executed in all aspects of the DOCC operations versus that of a WFX or other simulations-driven exercise. This affected the battle rhythm of the DOCC and the attack aviation unit. A corps will typically plan and execute at least two attack turns (against separate targets) per unit per night. In this operation, the DOCC focused planning for at least 24 hours on one troop-level operation. One leader expressed that one operation every 48 hours is more realistic. The targeting and planning cycle for the unit went out 96 hours.

Targeting of threat air defense systems was a major concern in the Task Force (TF). The level of detail desired in the current operation was much greater than that of WFX operations. Specifically, the DOCC and intelligence sources are normally focused on the target area during WFX deep operations. Units tend to discount the entire short-range air defense system (mainly shoulder-fired systems), and small arms densities located between the forward line of troops (FLOT) and the target area. In this operation, these weapon systems were the primary focus.

The level of detail and attention directed towards the use of Army Airspace Command and Control (A2C2) measures was much greater in the current operation than during the WFX. This is an area that BCTP would like to see more attention given to by exercise units. One major A2C2 area of concern was de-conflicting attack aviation routes and field artillery firing positions. This is an area that is not routinely exercised during WFXs. In Albania, this was an area the TF had to deal with. The problem is that there is no penalty for failing to use proper measures. BCTP is unable to get most units focused in this area.

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### **Key Lessons Learned:**

- The Battle Command Training Program structure and its focus on processes assist units in preparing for contingency operations. The program's focus on training senior commanders and staff, and reinforcing processes is effective.
- Units are not capable of conducting multiple battalion-level deep attacks each night.
- Units do not conduct targeting to the level of detail during WFXs that TF Hawk was required to do during its contingency operation. WFXs need to penalize units that fail to recognize the significant threat posed by short-range air defense and small arms to helicopters conducting deep operations.
- Units do not conduct A2C2 operations to the level of detail required of TF Hawk. Units need to take advantage of WFXs to use doctrinal A2C2 measures. The exercise needs to penalize units that fail to properly employ these measures.

### **Exercise Design**

The observation of TF Hawk raised several issues in the area of exercise design. These issues may be addressed in several forums including STARTEX conferences and White Cell meetings. Many of the issues are not new to the units or BCTP. The focus of this discussion is to highlight possible areas where BCTP and units can increase the reality and rigor of WFXs.

The task force experienced difficulty in integrating itself into the joint air operations campaign during the initial stages of the operation. Most of this was attributed to the limited exposure of the unit in joint air operations outside of exercises. The WFX, while exposing the unit somewhat to the friction and coordination complexities of joint air operations, did not fully prepare the unit for operations in Albania. BCTP, especially on corps-level exercises, is attempting to get units out of their comfort zone, normally the tactical level, and get them into the operational level of war. The vertical and horizontal integration role of the corps headquarters is key to this focus.

The terrain and weather had significant effects on the operations of the TF. The mountainous terrain, man-made hazards, and weather from the rear base of operations through the engagement areas proved to be challenging to the planners and operators during mission rehearsals. The CBS software used by BCTP does not replicate the terrain in enough detail, and does not replicate the natural and man-made hazards faced by the aviators at all. In addition, CBS has only a limited weather effects capability; the scripted weather is briefed to all the players.

Units conducting WFXs typically have multiple intelligence assets at their disposal throughout the exercise. A number of these assets are beyond their own organic assets. These may include the Joint Surveillance & Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), imagery, Guardrail, U2, and other theater and national assets. TF Hawk had access to all of these assets, but it did not have tasking authority to focus the assets on their upcoming missions. The only asset the TF had tasking authority for was the Hunter UAV (the unit also used its counter-fire radars and pilot debriefings as intelligence sources). The unit could send requests for information (RFIs) to the theater to get coverage from JSTARS, Predator, Guardrail, and U2.

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Communications were critical to success in the contingency operation. Many of the unit leaders believed communications are not emphasized enough during a BCTP WFX. The TF had 13 Tactical Satellite radio sets. It relied heavily on this communications link due to the terrain and the distances over which the unit operated. The unit was not authorized this number of radios (the authorized number was 3). The DOCC also used FM and UHF communications links.

Some of the key leaders would like to see the communications stressed during a WFX. Units, because of the close proximity of operations centers and the battle simulation center, do not have to use satellite and UHF communications; FM communications will suit their needs and are easier to use. One of the concerns with this set-up was that satellite communications are difficult to operate and maintain, and the knowledge, skills, and abilities associated with this form of communication are very perishable.

#### **Key Lessons Learned:**

- TF Hawk was under supply and maintenance constraints during the deployment. BCTP STARTEX agreements need to reflect these constraints during WFXs so that units do not become accustomed to operating in an unconstrained environment.
- The unit believed BCTP does stress the requirement to conduct joint air operations coordination. BCTP attempts to get corps to focus more on vertical and horizontal integration, which includes coordination in the joint arena.
- During WFXs, most units do not take advantage of the joint targeting assets available. Units should practice this during WFXs and receive credit when it is done well. This applies to all battlefield operating systems with sensors that reach beyond the capability of the unit to put fires on the target (either by restrictive rules of engagement (ROE) or weapon systems restrictions).
- BCTP WFX does reinforce basic processes for Judge Advocate General (JAG). However, BCTP should look at interjecting at least one scenario during an exercise which will stress the entire operational law system and should include legitimate military targets intermingled with refugees or protected sites. Contingency operations with restrictive ROE require more detailed and refined processes. There is a need to stress the requirement for these refined processes during WFXs.
- CBS does not provide enough detail in the areas of terrain, hazards, and weather. This may lead to units taking short cuts in these areas during the execution phase of exercises. Future models need to properly replicate these challenges to ground and air operations.
- Units do not always have the intelligence assets available during contingency operations that they have during WFXs. There are a lot of units competing for limited resources.
- Units can affect joint targeting and attack operations by passing their targetable data vertically and horizontally to elements that have the resources to attack the targets.
- Units do not take advantage of all training exercises to stress communications and the perishable skills associated with complicated communications systems.

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### **Army Family of Simulations**

BCTP uses a family of simulations to drive the WFXs. BCTP and the exercise units continuously search for ways to better simulate (not replicate) the capabilities and limitations of the systems available to both the exercise units and the World Class Opposing Force (WCOPFOR.) BCTP conducts periodic reviews of the CBS parameters developed to provide a realistic simulation of systems. The parameters committee consists of battlefield operating systems (BOS) chiefs and key subject matter experts (SME) from the operations groups, as well as simulation experts and contractors. These members attempt to solicit input from the branch schools. The committee recommends changes to computer code (very expensive and the least likely course of action) or workarounds (human actions designed to simulate system capabilities or TTP) to the BCTP leadership.

The CBS driven exercise provided excellent staff training, however, the TF Hawk leadership stated it did not allow for planning down to pilot level. During the Mission Rehearsal Exercises (MRE) the simulation model JCATS was used to provide the execution fidelity the commanders and staff desired. Using JCATS would have allowed the pilots to plan and brief each mission if time had been available. The issue is time and personnel requirements to replicate deep operations to the pilot level. The combination of simulations and additional time and resources would provide the training detail desired.

TF Hawk pre-deployment MRE was conducted on short notice at the Warrior Preparation Center (WPC). CBS, JCATS, TACSIM with HRSS, and UAV were the simulations used to support the exercise. CBS, TACSIM and UAV were primarily used to provide intelligence while JCATS provided the detail for mission execution. While no one simulation has the capability to provide a unit deploying on short notice the complete array of input and feedback, the mix of CBS and JCATS provided the detail and staff coordination requirements necessary to accomplish the mission.

### **Key Lessons Learned:**

- The use of CBS for a BCTP WFX meets all requirements for training division and corps staffs, if units want to plan and conduct mission briefs they have the ability to do so now. The use of other simulations for Mission Rehearsal Exercises may be a viable option and BCTP should explore the use of other training simulations that may be useful for MREs.
- BCTP should review other training simulations to determine their suitability of use for MREs.

### **Summary**

The results of this study indicate BCTP is executing its mission to prepare commanders and their staffs to execute combat operations. The focus of BCTP on battle command and the associated processes is working. However, both BCTP and the exercise units need to re-look the level of rigor of the exercises to get the units focused on details in the areas of targeting, A2C2, weather and terrain, and integration into the joint fight. The Army needs to design and field a simulation system that provides more detailed feedback to the commanders and their staffs, and a greater level of fidelity in the execution of missions. CBS works, but the field requires more.



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# US Air Force Deployment Lessons Learned Operation Allied Force

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The Air Force deployment of personnel in support of Operation ALLIED FORCE (OAF) was another example of the Carnegie principle of success, whereby success is achieved through 15% knowledge, 15% skill, and 70% attitude. Air Force personnel continually overcame adversity and achieved success because of their prevalent positive attitude. "Failure" is a word not found in an Airman's dictionary. This was evident during OAF by the successful missions managed and flown regardless of the problems encountered deploying and placing support personnel into the operational theater.

The logistics of moving large amounts of military personnel is not a new problem. In 217 B.C. Hannibal lost almost 15,000 men while deploying from Spain across the Alps to attack Rome. Fortunately, we have more modern elephants in our C-5, C-17, and C-141 aircraft and the physical movement of personnel and equipment is a process in which the Air Force excels. However, the management process of getting Air Force people to the operational theater requires refinement. Air Force deployment problems identified during OAF were in these areas: Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) development, Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up (PRSC) procedures, and Personnel Support for Contingency Operations (PERSCO) team setup after deployment.

The rapid build-up and requirements of Operation ALLIED FORCE strained the personnel deployment process within the Air Force. The number of people tasked for movement had not been this large since DESERT STORM. The loss of fully trained manning personnel since then was evident in the building of the TPFDD.



The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) uses the TPFDD as a tasking element which is composed of Unit Type Codes (UTC). UTCs are planning elements designed to minimize last minute changes of personnel and equipment within the TPFDD. Manning for TPFDD development was assigned upon execution, and all were willing to accomplish the task, but few had the expertise to complete the requirement. One result was that some fragmented and individual taskings were issued which resulted in pulling personnel from standard UTC deployment movement packages. Since the whole deployment package had not been selected, those UTCs were left with shortfalls. Later TPFDD builds requested those UTCs which now had to be filled from another source.

This lack of JOPES experienced or trained personnel created some confusion at a time when maximum stability was needed. The rapidly developing Air Expeditionary Force Center (AEFC) is fully integrating JOPES, TPFDD, and UTCs for personnel and equipment management. AEFC personnel will oversee these items in all phases of development for deploying units. (Air Force Instruction (AFI) 10-400, *Aerospace Expeditionary Force Planning*.) This oversight and concentrated training should help eliminate some of the problems with JOPES and TPFDD for those wings and units involved in the Air Expeditionary Forces.

The Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up (PSRC) process has been used for other contingencies since its initial use during DESERT STORM. However,

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during OAF the PSRC process was very cumbersome and created delays in fulfilling JOPES deployment taskings. Major problems were encountered with Reserve Unit Call-up approval because of the amount of senior level coordination required, and determination of who had the approval authority for unit activation. This created problems with JOPES since the units could not be tasked until activation had been approved. PSRC requests, by regulation, should be approved within 72 hours. However, some activation packages that took two to three days to process through coordination were initially approved and then denied because the final approval authority was improper. One consequence of this confusion was that some Reserve units were informed they would be activated and members were recalled, but the unit was never tasked for deployment. AFI 10-402, *Mobilization Planning*, addresses activating the Reserve Call-up but is sparse on the requesting and required approval process.

Deployed Air Force personnel are managed through a PERSCO team established at each loca-

tion. AFI 10-215, *Personnel Support for Contingency Operations*, contains the equipment and procedures for setting up deployed PERSCO operations at any location. Initially, USAF-Europe PERSCO members were managing the deploying personnel, but as things began to escalate these personnel were quickly overwhelmed. PERSCO teams began to arrive in theater but without the required computers and software as identified in AFI 10-215. This led to a “catch-up” process, as equipment became available, to establish accountability and locations of deployed personnel. Even after the equipment arrived and personnel accountability was established a communications structure was not always available to transmit the classified reports. PERSCO teams were eventually established as required and an accurate accounting of personnel was completed.

Regardless of the problems encountered, Operation ALLIED FORCE was a resoundingly successful Air Force operation. Our people, through their superb professional attitude, were responsible for this success.

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# **The Unit Archive: A New Technique to Capture Lessons Learned**

*Robert Murphy, Military Analyst  
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## **Learning Lessons the Hard Way**

The experience of others is often the best teacher. A unit's experiences when shared, allow us to learn from their successes and failures. However, in the joint community, we do not do a good job of capturing operational information that allows us to take advantage of those experiences. We do not maximize these learning experiences and are forced to learn the same lessons over and over again.

There is a system designed to capture joint lessons learned. Lessons learned are written in the Joint Universal Lessons Learned System (JULLS) and forwarded up the chain of command. These individual reports are analyzed by the command and recorded in Joint After-Action Reports (JAARs). These reports traditionally come from some type of internal evaluation or after-action report (AAR) that was directed by the unit commander. This is called passive collection. Commanders then submit JAARs to the Joint Staff (J-7) who share the report with the Joint Center for Lessons Learned (JCLL) for dissemination to the entire joint community, through the lessons learned database.

Unfortunately, this process does not always work smoothly or capture all operational information necessary for analysis. Additionally, existing software is based on 1980s dbase technology and cannot be used effectively on a local area network (LAN). The joint universal lessons learned system is further constrained by the fact that no operational information (operations orders, messages, briefings, etc.) is captured along with the JAAR.

### **Current Lessons Learned System Design Problems (If units do not use designated software, lessons are lost.)**

Lessons learned in the field are sent through the chain of command for processing, analysis, and dissemination. Following training exercises and actual operations, commanders direct their staff and subordinate commanders to conduct AARs of unit's performance during the operation or training event. The AAR is a review of the unit's training or actual operation that allows leaders and units to discover for themselves what happened and why. Through the AAR, units determine lessons learned and identify which tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) were effective, and which were not.

These reports are usually created with common software packages such as Microsoft Word or PowerPoint because these are the standard software packages used by the unit. Passive collection provides commanders the means to share their good ideas, proven TTPs/ SOPs, AARs, and operational information with the joint community. Unfortunately, as written, these reports cannot be easily submitted into the joint lessons learned system without manipulation. Someone on the staff must transpose all these reports into the standard lessons learned software. As you can guess, this is very manpower intensive. Therefore, many valuable lessons learned are not entered into the joint system. Even if lessons learned are entered into the system, there is no way to preserve operational information with the current lessons learned system and this may lead to problems with analyzing lessons learned if the full context of the operational environment is not understood.

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Units still try to do the right thing and forward valuable lessons learned revealed in unit evaluations and AARs up the chain of command. However, these reports only make it one or two levels before they disappear into someone's filing cabinet or database. Sometimes these documents are dusted off and used by the headquarters. But, more often than not, these types of documents are lost and there is no way to share this information with the entire joint community. This problem is a document or knowledge management flaw in the current lessons learned system.

### **A New Concept – The Lessons Learned Archive**

The simple solution to this problem is to change the joint lessons learned system. The new system should be a document or knowledge management system capable of capturing large quantities of information in every format. In this way, units could submit AARs and evaluations in any type format they desired. New technology would allow the user to do text searches to find relevant information. Other background and historical information could be managed in this system to provide a more in-depth understanding of the operational environment in which the lessons were learned or why it was learned. But, why stop there? Units could create a complete archive of an operation or an exercise containing all operational information.

Creating a comprehensive archive for a Joint Task Force (JTF) is often an afterthought. With some foresight and a good information manager, JTFs can assemble an archive that has relevance for future joint task forces and future operations. If document management systems are configured correctly while a joint task force is being stood up, the shell for the archive can be created simultaneously with the unit document management system. In fact, the day-to-day document management system simply becomes the archive once an exercise or operation is completed. In this way, the entire document management system can easily be saved as the archive.

This system would be relatively transparent to the staff. It would just be a question of where a staff member saved a document. The JTF information manager would have to initially issue some type of guidance governing the use of the information management system. Every staff member would need to understand the purpose of the information management system and abide by established document naming conventions and folder structure. However, this should benefit the JTF because all members of the staff would know where to find information within their staff section, and also shared information from other staff sections.

Capturing operational data must become a high priority for commanders as they seek to quickly assimilate operational information and assist future commanders in doing the same. Such archives also provide a wealth of information to analysts, scholars, and doctrine writers. Rapid advances in technology and leadership systems require refined and useful information for good decision making, and for creating a vision for future planning.

### **An Ideal Model Joint Task Force Noble Anvil (JTF-NA)**

Joint Task Force Noble Anvil (JTF-NA) has taken a major step in demonstrating how current technology can be used to archive operational information and preserve all types of lessons learned materials. JTF-NA designed an archive system to capture large volumes of information in various formats with an ability to search the information using a simple text search. This system also captures the information

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without adding a major workload to the staff. The archive has worldwide access to anyone with a Secure Internet Protocol Routing Network (SIPRNET) so that anyone interested can conduct research on the operation. This captured information is useful not only to the lessons learned community but to any other person or organization with a need.

The archive is located and maintained by EUCOM. You must have a password to access the site and EUCOM controls this access. The archive is server based and organized by joint code, board, cell, or major topic. It was built using Microsoft Front Page and Image Compose. This software web site creation and management tool allows the user to position elements exactly where they want them on the page, import and edit Hypertext Markup Language (HTML), and use the latest in Web technology, all without programming. The software can be locally purchased for about one hundred and fifty dollars. The site can be searched using a text based search engine that comes with the software. This search capability can be built using the search form from the Active Element option.

### **JTF Noble Anvil Archive Lessons Learned**

As with many lesson learned and historical information preservation projects, the JTF Noble Anvil archive was put together at the conclusion of the operation. Therefore, it was a great undertaking, consuming many man-hours after operations were complete. Many key staff leaders had departed the JTF or were involved with other activities.

Many important lessons learned can be gleaned from the construction of this archive. These lessons learned may apply to other joint task forces as they search for a way to manage information and preserve lessons learned and historical information.

- Nearly all staff members agreed that the archive could have been started at the beginning of the operation. The archive could have been based on a Microsoft Outlook structure that supported the local area network (LAN) structure. In this way, staff sections could have saved all of their work directly into shared folders that would have been readily available to other staff sections for coordination. At the conclusion of the operation, the entire shared directory could have been saved as the archive. The only thing that would have to be accomplished to put the archive on line is to build the hyperlinks to the various folders and documents.
- Key pages in the JTF Noble Anvil archive were first built using Microsoft PowerPoint that allowed relatively easy concept development and staffing. After construction, these PowerPoint mock-up slides were converted into table based web pages using Microsoft Front Page and Image Compose. This technique worked extremely well for JTF Noble Anvil.
- The information manager position is critical to successfully manage the volumes of information that were created by the JTF. This job would be a full-time position for a senior staff member who completely understands joint operations and information management techniques. The responsibility of establishing a workable standard operating procedure (SOP) defining what, how, and where the staff would store information is critical to the success of this information management technique. Additionally, the information manager would be responsible for training the various staff sections on this SOP.

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### **Conclusion: Can this Archive Work for Your Unit?**

Due to the current United States military operations tempo, it is imperative to do things right the first time we conduct military operations. Military forces do not have the time or resources to relearn lessons from previous operations or exercises.

In order to properly learn from previous experiences, military units must be able to preserve and disseminate lessons learned. The current joint lessons learned system does not allow units to easily do this. Therefore, a new lessons learned system is needed. Units should be able to use standard software packages such as Microsoft Word or PowerPoint as the vehicle to share lessons learned with the joint community. The archive used by Joint Task Force Noble Anvil allows units to do this and may be the solution to this problem.

With proper foresight and trained personnel, joint task forces can design a knowledge management system that can be used for daily operations, be transparent to users, and then be saved as an archive for any operation or exercise. Capturing this operational information must be a high priority for military units. These archives provide a wealth of information to analysts, scholars, doctrine writers, and other joint units.



Photo Courtesy DoD Joint Combat Camera





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